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Human language has no close parallels in other systems of animal 
communication. Yet it is an important part of the cultural adaptation that serves 
to make humans an exceedingly successful species. In the past 20 years, a 
diverse set of evolutionary scholars have tried to answer the question of how 
language evolved in our species and why it is unique to us. They have 
converged on the idea that the cultural and innate aspects of language were 
tightly linked in a process of gene-culture coevolution. They differ widely about 
the details of the process, particularly over the division of labor between genes 
and culture in the coevolutionary process. Why is language restricted to humans 
given that communication seems to be so useful? A plausible answer is that 
language is part of human cooperation. Why did the coevolutionary process 
come to rest leaving impressive cultural diversity in human languages? A 
plausible answer is that language diversity functions to limit communication 
between people who cannot freely trust one another or where even truthful 
communications from others would result in maladaptive behavior on the part 
of listeners. 
 
 
Keywords: cultural evolution; evolution of cooperation and language; evo-
lution of linguistic diversity  
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Humans are highly unusual animals in depending upon social transmission from 
others for acquiring most of their adaptations (Boyd & Richerson 2005, Richerson & 
Boyd 2005), including the specific languages they speak. Language is essential to our 
complex social life, revolving as it does around institutions that are transmitted by 
language and operated by oratory. The evolution of language as a human capacity, 
and of languages themselves, are subjects of a large and growing literature. Many 
important and controversial issues are under examination including the roles of 
cultural and genetic evolution in the process and the role of general purpose versus 
language specific innate cognitive resources. Culture itself evolves by processes that 
are something like the evolution of genes, but which are different in many important 
details. In the case of language, the cultural evolutionary processes by which 
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languages change over time are tolerably well understood from the work of socio-
linguists (Labov 1994, Labov 2001) and historical linguists (Deutscher 2005). The 
application of formal phylogenetic methods borrowed from evolutionary biology to 
the reconstruction of language evolution is an active area of research (Gray et al. 
2009, Pagel 2009). We have reasonable general models of cultural evolution (Henrich 
& McElreath 2008). We have good models of the coevolutionary process (Richerson 
& Boyd 1989, Feldman & Laland 1996).  
 The coevolutionary approach to the evolution of language was first articulated 
by Pinker & Bloom (1990). They imagine that the first step in the evolution of human 
language would be a rudimentary culturally transmitted set of signals. If having 
such signals were adaptively advantageous, selection might fall in genes to expand 
the capacity to acquire such signals. So long as a higher capacity cultural communi-
cation system was favored, cognitive modifications to more efficiently acquire expli-
citly linguistic features like symbolic words and grammar would be favored as the 
system passed some threshold of complexity. Eventually, languages with a rather 
large vocabulary and complex syntax and/or morphology became cognitively 
possible. Coevolution assumes that some relatively easy and gradual path was 
available such that the evolution of language could proceed from simple vocal and 
gestural communications to human language by some combination of small cultural 
and innate steps, at least after some key cognitive precursors had evolved (Origgi & 
Sperber 2000). See Donald (1991), Deacon (1997), Tomasello (2008), and Progovac 
(this volume) on how language might have evolved gradually. 
 Pinker (2003) continues to argue that humans were equipped by the 
coevolutionary process with specialized innate mechanisms to manage language 
acquisition, production, and comprehension. Others have argued that more general 
cognitive resources, perhaps especially resources shared by other domains of 
culture, can underpin language. We have formal models of how language specific 
features like compositionality might evolve by cultural evolution by languages 
adapting to be learnable using general cognitive resources (de Boer 2000, Munroe & 
Cangelosi 2002, Smith & Kirby 2008). Steels (2009) has simulated how language 
might be invented using sufficiently powerful general cognitive resources using 
laboratory robots. Briscoe (2009) argues that even if general cognitive resources are 
sufficient to initiate simple languages, coevolution would have produced at least 
some language specific biases and constraints to make langue more efficiently 
learnable. Of course, some genetic changes must have accompanied the evolution of 
language since even chimpanzees and bonobos when raised in a linguistic 
environment develop, at best, a rudimentary form of language (Savage-Rumbaugh & 
Lewin 1994). Tomasello (2008) emphasizes the idea of a cognitive complex of shared 
attention, collaborative activities, social motivation and cultural evolution that is 
important for language and technical and social skills. Bloom (2000) emphasized the 
cognitive strategies used to learn words. Dehaene’s (2009) interesting work on 
reading shows how visual circuits evolved to process normal visual stimuli can be 
‘recycled’ to transmit linguistic information in the visual mode, providing a possible 
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model for earlier coevolutionary events. Nettle (2007) raises the possibility that this 
sort of coevolution still goes on. Subtle differences in innate capacities may have 
coevolved with different language families; for example, populations with a long 
history of using tone to make linguistic distinctions may find it slightly easier to 
learn and use tones than populations not so exposed (Dediu & Ladd 2007). Good 
evidence to this effect would suggest that the coevolutionary process indeed affects 
language evolution. Thus, while a consensus exists that human language evolved by 
a coevolutionary scenario, evolutionary linguists differ greatly on the details. 
 This bare-bones account leaves many unanswered questions. Two seem funda-
mental to us. First, why is human language unique? Not only primates but also 
parrots and songbirds have preadaptations for vocal communication and vocal imi-
tation (Baptista & Trail 1992, Pepperberg 2000). Human language is widely counted 
as our most spectacular adaptation, the very adaptation that made us human, and 
the adaptation that constitutes the latest ‘major transition of life’ (Maynard Smith & 
Szathmáry 1995). Maynard Smith & Szathmáry’s other major transitions happened 
long ago; why was this one so tardy? Many species would seem to have rudimentary 
communication systems that could fall under the influence of the coevolutionary 
mechanism outlined above. Under what scenario might humans, but not other speci-
es, come under selection for an advanced inter-individual communication system? 
 The functional hallmark of human language is to combine a large vocabulary 
of meaningful words into utterances using syntactic rules that convey much inform-
ation about how the string of words in an utterance modify each other’s meanings. 
How might evolutionary processes favor the evolution of a high information volume 
communication system in humans? One possible answer is that humans were the 
first to acquire some sort of cognitive breakthrough. For example, Sperber (2000) is 
concerned with whether ‘metarepresentation’ (the ability to represent the thoughts 
of others) is a precondition for the evolution of language and Donald (2001) with the 
issue of whether human cultural capacities had to be fairly advanced before 
language could arise. In contrast, we suggest that syntax and semantics are the easy 
part of the evolution of language. The hard part is to figure out how humans could 
make use of language. Less provocatively, given innate cognitive adaptations of 
some kind were necessary for language, to use language, hearers must trust 
speakers. If they did not, they would not listen, and language would collapse. Grice 
(1975: 45) noted that to function conversation had to conform to a cooperative prin-
ciple. But evolutionary biology teaches us that trust between individuals evolves 
with difficulty. Hence, the difficulty from the evolutionary perspective is how trust 
can evolve. If trust evolves, the cognitive bases of complex communication might 
evolve without serious impediment. The problem of cooperation is central to a 
number of accounts of the evolution human language (e.g., Hurford 2007, Tomasello 
2008). 
 Second, how can we account for the large role of culture in language? Noam 
Chomsky has recently advocated a minimalist approach to the innate components of 
language (Chomsky 1995, 2005, Hauser et al. 2002). Minimalists themselves debate 
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about exactly what is innate, what is perhaps innate but not specific to language, and 
what can be off-loaded to the cultural system (e.g., Arsenijević & Hinzen, this 
volume). Generative grammarians who pursued the idea that surface diversity of 
grammars could be rigorously tied to a parsimonious set of principles and 
parameters seem not to have succeeded (Newmeyer 2005). Agreeing with this 
assessment, sociolinguists and historical linguists propose mechanisms, based on 
observations about how language actually changes generation by generation, that 
seem to account for how a vast diversity of languages can evolve culturally (Guy 
1996, Deutscher 2005). Whatever is innate is very deep and hardly constrains the 
design space of syntax and lexicon (Progovac, this volume). 
 We can imagine that language learning and subsequent communication would 
be more efficient if more of it was innate. This is seemingly the logic of the much 
mooted massive modularity hypothesis for cognitive architecture generally (Tooby 
& Cosmides 1989, Sterelny 2003). For example, we could imagine a communication 
system that is largely specified innately (Sampson 2002). Such a system might 
superficially resemble a family of languages like the Romance Languages. Most of 
the grammar and much of the vocabulary would be quite similar across all the 
world’s languages, yet a ‘Castilian’ child adopted by ‘Catalans’ might have consider-
able difficulty learning ‘Catalan’ because of having innate adaptations to speak 
‘Castilian’. Or perhaps everyone would just innately speak ‘Catalan’, but with minor 
culturally determined ‘Valencian’ and ‘Barcelonan’ dialects. This scenario is clearly 
counterfactual. Languages seem to be much more culturally diverse than they need 
to be for communicative efficiency. Students of the structural variation in human 
languages keep discovering structural principles as the number of well-studied 
languages grows to the point of questioning whether there are any language 
universals at all (Evans & Levinson 2009). Indeed, their balkanization into thousands 
of mutually unintelligible languages and tens of thousands mutually difficult to 
understand dialects is odd if selection fell only on communicative efficiency. 
Wouldn’t communicative efficiency be maximized if we innately spoke a common 
regular language like Esperanto? We need to ask if language variation is somehow 
adaptive. 
 
 
2. Why Possibly Language is Restricted to Humans 
 
Language is not the only rich communication system in nature. The cells in our body 
use nerves and hormones to coordinate our exceedingly complex development, 
physiology and behavior. For example, the development of complex organisms 
proceeds by intercellular signaling such that each cell eventually matures in the type 
appropriate for the tissue it finds itself in. The famous FOXP2 gene codes for a 
regulatory protein active in the development of all vertebrates. The common human 
variant differs at two amino acids from that in chimpanzees and a particular rare 
variant causes a specific language impairment in one well-studied family. However, 
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FOXP2 is expressed in many tissues during development in humans. Preliminary 
broad scale scans suggest that it may have hundreds of targets in a variety of tissues 
(Fisher & Scharff 2009). If so, one might imagine that genes exhibit the property of 
compositionality. FOXP2 is like a ‘word’ with a particular meaning that can partici-
pate in many developmental ‘sentences’. We are not aware of any careful analysis 
intercellular communication systems for formal analogies to language, but as we 
learn more about how these systems work, they might be grist for comparative 
analysis. Interestingly, biologists have described many mechanisms by which rich in-
ternal communication systems are ‘policed’ to ensure a community of interest, safe-
guarding the basis of communication (Frank 2003). Such policing is necessary 
because pressure from deceptive entities, like cancer cells, to reproduce at the ex-
pense of the collective always exists. 
 The mathematical theory of animal communication was pioneered by John 
Maynard Smith (1976, 1994) and has recently been applied to human language by 
Lachman et al. (2001) and Lachmann & Bergstrom (2001, 2004). The basic problem is 
that individuals do not normally have enough commonality of interests to make 
honest communication possible. The relationship between individuals is normally 
competitive, and any communication thus tends to be self-interested. However, this 
self-interestedness means that recipients of communications cannot trust the talk of 
communicators, so free communication does not evolve. Thus, animal communi-
cation is normally extremely impoverished. Animal communications are costly 
signals, cases in which deceptive signals can be punished cheaply, or cases in which 
the ‘communication’ is an unmodifiable index of some attribute, as size is an index of 
strength. Peacocks’ tails and the red deer stag’s adaptations for male-male combat 
are two stock examples of costly signals. These features advertise the size and health 
status of males, the quality of their genes, and their fighting prowess to others in the 
vicinity in order to attract females and intimidate competing males. These signals are 
trustworthy indicators of male quality because only large, healthy males can carry a 
large display of gaudy feathers or develop the muscles and antlers to be competitive 
in fights between males. A male that produced deceptively large but weak antlers 
would risk injury if he had his bluff called by males with well-constructed antlers. A 
population might start with cheap, accurate signals of genetic quality or fighting 
prowess, but such communication will be undermined by mutant males that use 
resources to fake the signal, resulting in an arms race that ends up with an expensive 
unfakable signal. At an evolutionary equilibrium, the signal will be so costly that 
inferior males simply have insufficient resources to generate a fake signal of quality. 
Such a system has such a high overhead that it can produce only a handful of critical 
messages. Maynard Smith & Harper (2003) discuss some situations in which signals 
do not have to be costly subject to punishment. The most important one relevant to 
language is that in some situations individuals have no conflicts of interest. For 
example a foreign motorist might ask us to explain a traffic rule. We would have an 
interest in providing the correct answer, at least if the foreigner is driving on the 
same road, because having the correct answer will make her less likely to hit us.  
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 Lachmann & Bergstrom show that a combinatorial communication system that 
relies on rules to interpret a sentence composed of words is especially vulnerable to 
deceptive messages and is therefore requires considerable cooperation to evolve. The 
value of a combinatorial communication system is that it permits limitless flexibility 
in the construction of messages using a finite number of words, but deceivers can 
use this flexibility to compose artful manipulative messages that recipients will 
interpret to the advantage of the signaler but to their own detriment. Merely policing 
the meanings of words and grammatical rules will not prevent lying. Thus, the 
theory tells us that rich combinatorial language-like systems evolve under a special 
handicap. This perhaps helps explain why language-like rich communication 
systems are of very restricted occurrence.  
 Human language is part of the extraordinary cooperation of humans with dis-
tantly related or unrelated people. The philosopher of language Paul Grice was the 
first person to note the centrality of cooperation in language, and many evolutionary 
linguists have concurred (Grice 1975; see also Sperber & Wilson 1995, Dessalles 1998, 
Knight 1998, Csibra & Gergely 2006, and Hurford 2007). Cooperation in language 
exists at two levels (Hurford 2007). First speakers must agree on common definitions 
of words and use the same grammatical rules if any communication is to take place 
at all. Second, language usage would collapse (or never arise in the first place) if 
speakers did not generally provide useful information to hearers, as the mathemati-
cal theory suggests. We take it that coordination on the meaning of words and gram-
matical rules is an easier evolutionary problem than the problem of maintaining high 
levels of truthfulness in the face of self-serving temptations. Because humans cooper-
ate in large groups of distantly related and unrelated individuals, we both have a use 
for language — to organize our social life — and enough commonality of interest to 
support a rich, cheap, and trustworthy communication system (Nettle 2006, Toma-
sello 2008). We also police the system — telling a lie is a sin (Scott-Phillips 2008).  
 A number of evolutionary hypotheses are on the table to explain this cooper-
ation (Richerson et al. 2003, Krebs 2008). One of these is the Tribal Social Instincts 
hypothesis (Richerson & Boyd 1999), which is a modernization of a hypothesis first 
proposed by Darwin (1874) in the Descent of Man. It proposes that human 
cooperation arose because human cultural variation is especially susceptible to 
selection at the level of the group. The ancestral groups that were relevant during the 
evolution of our social psychology were tribes, ethnolinguistic units ranging in size 
from a few hundred to a few thousand people. Normally, selection is strongest at the 
level of individuals, leading to competition between individuals for reproductive 
success. Groups of individuals can fall under strong enough selection to lead to 
within group cooperation, but the conditions are fairly stringent except when groups 
are small or closely related. Kin assortment leads to reduced genetic variation within 
groups and exaggerated variation between them, and group selection requires 
persistent genetic variation at the group level to work. The reasons that culture is 
unusually susceptible to group selection on a much larger scale than genetic kin 
groups are outlined in Richerson & Boyd (2005: 203–213) and more formally by 
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Henrich (2004). The linguist reader should be warned that the evolution of cooper-
ation literature is bedeviled by terminological claims masquerading as scientific 
ones. Recent examples include West et al. (2007) and Gardner & Grafen (2009). 
 The basic idea is that culture much more easily than genes preserves variation 
between large groups of unrelated or distantly related individuals. Culture evolves 
more rapidly than genes because culture is modified by learned innovations not just 
random mutation and because we can actively choose superior variants either by 
direct experimentation with variants or by rules of thumb like imitating the success-
ful or prestigious. Preserving variation between groups requires that variation 
between groups has to evolve fast enough to mitigate the blending effects of mi-
gration. In genetic evolution, selection and drift are generally not able to maintain 
much variation between neighboring groups whereas cultural processes can. Bell et 
al. (2009) used the World Values Survey to estimate cultural variation between 
neighboring nations and compared these estimates to published estimates of genetic 
variation for the same nations. Mean cultural differences are more than ten times 
greater than genetic differences, and the cultural differences are probably under-
estimated. Many important differences between groups are institutions maintained 
by social sanctions (Herrmann et al. 2008). If punishment keeps deviants rare, the 
differences between neighboring societies can be virtually categorical. We will 
shortly consider a linguistic mechanism that limits mixing between groups, helping 
to preserve between group variation.  
 Innate elements of our social psychology — Darwin argued that sympathy and 
patriotism were among our ‘social instincts’ — would have evolved by gene-culture 
coevolution following the same logic outlined above for the language faculty. 
Language would have been an important element of the evolution of cooperation. 
Language is obviously a general purpose communication system that today we use 
to talk about practically everything. For the purpose of formulating hypotheses 
about the intertwined evolution of language and cooperation, we need to imagine 
what the main function(s) of protolanguage were near the beginning of the co-
evolutionary sequence that eventually gave rise to our advanced capacity for 
language. To get an impression of what mimetic pre-linguistic but otherwise highly 
imitative hominins might have been able do with without language, Donald (1991) 
reviewed the literature on 19th century people deaf from birth (so-called then ‘deaf-
mutes’). Deaf-from-birth people led surprisingly normal lives even when they ac-
quired no language skills beyond simple ‘home signs’ they invented to communicate 
with family members. Most of them learned skills necessary to support themselves, 
typically a manual trade or farming, and some became prosperous. Many married 
and otherwise had relatively normal social lives. This evidence suggests, Donald 
argues, that humans might well have had a fairly advanced cultural system before the 
capacity for language evolved. Thus, cultural group selection might have selected for 
a measure of extra-familial altruism before the evolution of language even began. 
 However, we think it unlikely that social systems of the complexity that living 
hunter-gatherers operate could have functioned without language (see Dunbar 1996 
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for a slightly different version of this argument). The social life of even the simplest 
known hunter-gatherer societies, such as the San peoples of the Kalahari and the 
Shoshone of the North American Great Basin, was regulated by institutions, 
commonly known rules governing social behavior (Maryanski & Turner 1992). For 
example, the famous !Kung (Ju/’hoansi) San peoples have a complex tripartite kin-
ship system that in effect makes everyone at least a fictive kin to everyone else, even 
if no genea-logical connection is known (Lee 1986). They also have a ceremonial gift 
exchange system that cements ties of friendship with people living in distant camps 
(Wiessner 2002). A large number of the gift relationships are with distantly related 
people, especially on the part of successful hunters and their wives. Even these 
comparatively simple institutions are encoded, transmitted, and reinforced linguis- 
tically through stories, gossip, complaining and shaming (Wiessner 2005). In many 
cases, hunter-gatherer social institutions were not at all simple. The marriage 
systems of the societies in the Australian central desert were very elaborate, for ex-
ample (Yengoyan 1968). One might imagine that the first steps toward human coop- 
eration in large groups might have taken place before language, but it is hard to see 
complex institutions arising and being maintained across a large group without it.  
 The general proposition that human intelligence evolved for its social 
functions is sometimes called the social intelligence or Machiavellian intelligence 
hypothesis (Dunbar 1996, Whiten & Byrne 1997). It is often contrasted with an ecolo-
gical intelligence hypothesis. We think that the social intelligence hypothesis as 
usually stated does not give sufficient attention to the fact that hunter-gatherer 
subsistence was an intensely social enterprise (Steward 1955). In humans, social intelli-
gence is fundamental to our ecological adaptation. The human hunting and 
gathering adaptation depended substantially upon cooperative big game hunting, 
especially during the late Pleistocene (Stiner 2002). Hunting probably provided the 
nutrients necessary to grow and sustain our very expensive brain (Aiello & Wheeler 
1995, Kaplan et al. 2000). Many of the skills involved in hunting could perhaps have 
been learned by alinguistic imitation — all those skills for which a picture is worth a 
thousand words. However, at least one skill, tracking, is practiced in living hunter-
gatherers as a sophisticated collective hypothesis testing enterprise in which verbal 
discussion is essential (see also Liebenberg 1990, Guthrie 2005). Trackers need to 
have natural-historical knowledge that often outruns that of the modern naturalists 
who have interacted with them (Blurton-Jones & Konner 1976) and would no doubt 
be hard to transmit without language.  
 The evolution of human intelligence might well have been driven directly by 
recent climate deterioration. Some theoretical and empirical evidence supports the 
idea that the evolution of complex, cumulatively improvable culture, including 
languages, was driven directly by increasingly variable environments over the last 
few million years (Calvin 2002, Richerson et al. 2005). Simple evolutionary models of 
culture suggest that the main adaptive advantage of a costly system of social 
learning is adaptation to environments with rapid, high amplitude variation (Boyd & 
Richerson 1985). If environmental variation is modest or if change is slow, genetic 
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evolution tracks changes well enough. If it is very rapid, then adaptation is via 
mechanisms of phenotypic flexibility like individual learning and important parts of 
the immune system. Combining individual phenotypic flexibility with the inheri-
tance of acquired variation by social learning is adaptive in environments with high 
variability but intermediate rates of change. Culture can economize on learning by 
creating transmitted adaptations to environments that persist for a generation to 
some tens or even hundreds of generations. Work on ice and ocean cores has shown 
that the last ice age had the sort of high amplitude millennial and sub-millennial 
scale variation climate variation that the models predict would favor culture (Alley 
2000). A recent ocean core suggests that the amount of millennial and sub-millennial 
scale variation has increased over the last four ice ages (Martrat et al. 2007). If the 
symbolic artifacts recovered by paleoanthropologists — scarcer and simple before 
50,000 year ago, more numerous and more sophisticated after that date — are 
indicative of the emergence or improvement of languages, they may have evolved in 
response to the demands of the hypervariable climate of the last ice age. Coinci-
dently or not the hypervariable part of the last ice age started about 70,000 years ago, 
not long before the paleoanthropological evidence suggests that human symbolic 
capacities and other indications of behavior likely to be related to language appeared 
in the record, and shortly before modern humans spread out of Africa (Richerson et 
al. 2009). As far as is currently known, the particular pattern of climate variability of 
the Plio-Pleistocene ice ages is unique and is thus a candidate to help explain why 
the human ‘major transition’ occurred so recently. 
 
 
3. Why is Language Weakly Constrained by Genes? 
 
The number and diversity of human languages is stunning, akin to the species 
diversity of rain forest trees and coral reef fishes (Nettle 1999). The total number of 
living languages in the world is currently about 7,000 (http://www.ethnologue. 
com), about 1,000 of which are spoken on New Guinea. Unlike species that typically 
differ in functionally important ways, languages are largely functionally equivalent. 
 Several authors have suggested that the function of language and similar 
symbolic differences is to mark the boundaries of social groups (Labov 1973, Nettle 
& Dunbar 1997, Livingstone & Fyfe 1999, Nettle 1999, and Livingstone 2002). They 
serve to identify those who are ‘like us’ and those who belong to other groups. 
Language differences function to limit communication and hence the spread of ideas 
from one community to another. People from other groups are liable to tell you self-
serving lies. They are also likely to tell you things that are useless in the physical and 
social ecology in which you live. Human cultures are ecologically a lot like species. 
They typically have different social institutions and often different ways of making a 
living (Barth 1969). Imitating people from a different culture may often be a bad 
thing to do (Gil-White 2005). Language diversity perhaps limits communication 
adaptively. 
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 Mathematical models support this line of reasoning. Boyd & Richerson (1987) 
studied a cultural evolutionary model in which two populations lived in different 
environments. A different value of a quantitative adaptive character was optimal in 
each environment and there was a generic neutral marker character, also quanti-
tative. (Quantitative characters are behaviors that can be measured on a continuous 
scale, such as the location of a vowel in formant space). Individuals migrated 
between the two populations, tending to homogenize them at some intermediate 
value of the adaptive character not well adapted to either environment. Counter-
acting mixing, juveniles were assumed to have a tendency to adopt the value of the 
adaptive character from people whose value of the neutral marker, say their dialect, 
resembled theirs. They also prefer to imitate people who are successful. In the model, 
the marker characters in the two populations diverged, generating a correlation 
between the marker and the adaptive trait. At equilibrium, the mean value of the 
adaptive trait was at the optimum in both environments. The preference for 
imitating people like you with regard to a neutral marker trait in the presence of a 
strong correlation between adaptive and marker characters set up an adaptive 
barrier limiting the flow of wrong ideas from the other environment even in the face 
of rather strong physical migration.  
 McElreath et al. (2003) studied a conceptually similar model but this time using 
discrete characters. They also modeled the environment as a social game of 
coordination rather than a different physical environment. Games of coordination 
are ones in which high payoffs depend upon matching the behavior of others. 
Languages are a massive game of coordination. Unless our grammar and lexicon at 
least roughly match those with whom we wish to communicate, we will fail. Once 
again migration tends to homogenize the populations but a correlation arises 
between the neutral marker characters and the move in the game of coordination. 
Eventually people in the two populations usually play with partners that correctly 
match their coordination move. Because language can evolve differences so rapidly, 
it can evolve to calibrate our discrimination against outsiders quite sensitively. I may 
perfectly well understand someone whose dialect differs only modestly from mine, 
but I may still distrust them. On the other hand, someone speaking a strange dialect 
is offering me something that I can judge independently to be highly useful, I might 
adopt it despite a general suspicion of such folks. Sociolinguists tell us that we make 
many social decisions based on subtle linguistic differences. Those who study the 
diffusion of innovations tell us that we can overcome linguistic barriers to the 
diffusion of ideas and techniques if we are sufficiently motivated. The models are 
very crude by comparison, but they lend credence to the adaptive importance of 
linguistic diversity but also to the flexibility of linguistic boundaries. Efferson et al. 
(2008) verified that symbolic markers could evolve in laboratory microsocieties.  
 Interestingly, in McElreath et al.’s (2003) model, symbolic differentiation 
cannot arise in the first instance to mark cooperators. (See Nettle & Dunbar (1997) for 
a model with different results.) The reason is that carrying a mark that identifies an 
individual as a cooperator favors the evolution of selfish non-cooperators who carry 
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the mark and victimize true cooperators. Games of coordination and ordinary 
adaptive differences do not contain a dilemma of cooperation and are not vulnerable 
to this problem. What symbolic differences, first among them linguistic differences, 
will do is inhibit communication between groups, tending to preserve variation 
between groups. Selection between such groups can then lead to ingroup 
cooperation and distrust of outgroups (Richerson & Boyd 2005).  
 These model results are in rough accord with the literature on ethnicity 
(LeVine & Campbell 1972). People speaking different languages may not normally 
communicate much, but, unlike biological species, they are not completely infor-
mationally isolated from one another. Ethnographic data from small-scale societies 
suggest that linguistic and other symbolic boundaries often mark the limits of trust 
and cooperation. The role of ethnicity in conflict in modern societies is well known 
(e.g., Horowitz 2001). 
 The role of language as a symbolic marker of group boundaries has been well 
studied by sociolinguists (Labov 1980, 2001). Labov and other sociolinguists dis-
covered that subtle phonological changes grow up rapidly wherever social fault lines 
arise. For example, on Martha’s Vineyard, a rural island off the coast of Massa-
chusetts, the influx of summer tourists caused Vineyarders’ speech to diverge 
detectably from the standard New England dialect. People seem to condition their 
behavior on the dialects that others speak. It is not hard to project the sociolinguistic 
mechanisms that cause small-scale generation to generation changes in languages to 
the multigeneration scale on which new dialects, new languages, and eventually 
new language families evolve (Nettle 1999, Deutscher 2005). Among the fields of 
language change that strike us as well studied include grammaticalization, the pro-
cess by which conventional lexical constructions come to have syntactic functions 
(Hopper & Traugott 2003) and the way in which languages in contact influence each 
other (Thomason 2001). 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The theory of gene-culture coevolution has provided a useful framework for 
analyzing the evolution of language. Indeed, we are not aware of any contemporary 
students of language evolution who do not subscribe to some form of coevolutionary 
argument. Evolutionary linguists do differ about the division of labor between genes 
and culture that they propose. Some authors such as Tomasello (2008) and Kirby et 
al. (2009) posit a large role for culture in adapting language to pre-linguistic 
cognitive capacities or ones shared with other aspects of culture. Others, for example 
Pinker (2003), argue for much language specific innate cognitive adaptation. Evo-
lutionists could contribute to this debate if it were clear what the design constraints 
on cognitive architecture are. The idea that specialized cognitive architecture is 
highly efficient is appealing, but the relatively general heuristics like joint attention 
that make cultural transmission efficient are impressive as well. The detailed answer 
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to the division of labor question is, we think, largely a matter for neurobiologists to 
unravel. Evolutionary considerations can provide a theory for the level of trust and 
cooperation necessary to make cheap, accurate, and abundant communication 
between humans possible and an explanation for why at least some cultural 
variation remains in language. In conjunction with data from paleoanthropology, pa-
leoclimatology, and paleoecology we can produce hypotheses about when language 
probably evolved and why it evolved only in the human lineage. Without doubt, all 
of these are very difficult questions. We do not flatter ourselves that the specific 
proposals here will survive challenges of new data, for example data on the history 
of the genes that underpin language. We are more confident that the form of the 
coevolutionary analysis is correct. 
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